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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins I in the spring of 1989, both sides claimed vic-
tory.2 The Court's plurality opinion lowered the standard of proof
imposed by the court of appeals for an employer to escape liability for
certain alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
But the decision also affirmed the shifting of the burden of persuasion
to the defendant-employer where there is direct evidence that the
employer relied on both permissible and impermissible factors in
making its employment decision.' The defendant-employer, the
Supreme Court concluded, could escape liability in such "mixed-
motive" cases only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiff's gender into account.5
Price Waterhouse claimed that it did not promote Ann Hopkins
to partner because of what it perceived to be severe shortcomings in
1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
2. "[L]awyers on both sides professed to be able to find clarity-and victory-in wholly
different parts of the ruling. Tony Mauro, Court Remains Befuddled by Title VII, LEGAL
TIMES, May 15, 1989, at 10.
3. The Court found that the court of appeals erred in holding that an employer may
escape liability for a Title VII violation "if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 237.
4. "[I]f an employer allows gender to affect its decisionmaking process, then it must carry
the burden of justifying its ultimate decision." Id. at 248.
5. Id. at 258.
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her interpersonal skills.6 At trial, the district court found this to be a
legitimate factor in the accounting firm's evaluation.7 However, the
trial judge also found that in evaluating Hopkins' performance, Price
Waterhouse had given substantial weight to comments tainted by sex
stereotyping.8 Reliance on these comments in the evaluation process
constituted an impermissible factor in the firm's decision not to make
Hopkins a partner.9 Because the firm considered both legitimate and
illegitimate factors, the Court dubbed the case one involving "mixed-
motive[s]. '"'
Despite Hopkins' success on remand,11 this Note argues that the
Supreme Court's construction of the case is ultimately unsatisfactory.
Part II examines the district court's findings of fact and the Court's
reliance on these facts in crafting its mixed-motive standard. Part III
surveys social psychology research to provide an alternative explana-
tion for the intensely critical evaluation Hopkins received. Part IV
demonstrates that the Court erred in accepting the firm's highly sus-
pect appraisal at face value. This Part suggests that the motives
attributed to Price Waterhouse were not, as the Court suggests,
"mixed" at all, but rather uniformly illegitimate. Closer examination
of the remarks characterizing Hopkins' interpersonal skills, viewed in
the context of her employment situation, reveals that these assess-
ments were probably discriminatory. Finally, Part V suggests a
stricter rule that would require an employer in a mixed-motive case to
prove that its "legitimate" assessment of interpersonal skills was free
from sex stereotyping, and applies the rule to the Price Waterhouse
case.
6. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, and remanded, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 490 U.S. 228
(1989).
7. Id. at 1114.
8. Id. at 1120.
9. Id.
10. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
11. On remand, the district court held that Price Waterhouse had failed to meet its burden
of persuasion under the lower preponderance of the evidence standard. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The
court found that "Price Waterhouse ha[d] failed to separate out those comments tainted by
sexism from those free of sexism for the purpose of demonstrating that non-discriminatory
factors alone justified the hold decision." Id. The firm was ordered to admit Hopkins as a
partner and to pay her $371,175 in back compensation and interest. Id. at 1216-17. Price
Waterhouse appealed, but the judgment was affirmed in its entirety by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. 920 F.2d 967, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Ann Hopkins
returned to Price Waterhouse in February, 1991, at the salary level of a seventh-year partner.
According to one of her attorneys, Douglas B. Huron, co-counsel, the firm was "treating her




II. EVOLUTION OF THE CASE
At Price Waterhouse, a senior manager becomes a partnership
candidate when the partners in her local office submit her name as a
candidate. 12 All other partners in the firm are then asked to submit
comments on each candidate on either a long or short form, depend-
ing on how well the partner knows the candidate.' 3 Not every partner
submits comments on every candidate. '4 The Admissions Committee
reviews the comments, interviews the partners who made them, and
makes a recommendation to the Policy Board either endorsing the
candidate, placing her application on "hold," or denying her the pro-
motion.'5 The Policy Board then decides whether to submit the can-
didate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to place her
candidacy on hold, or to reject her. 6
The process is not controlled by fixed guidelines. A candidate is
not guaranteed success because of a certain number of positive com-
ments, nor will she necessarily fail because of a specific number of
negative remarks.' 7 Ann Hopkins had been a senior manager at the
firm's Office of Government Services for five years when she was pro-
posed for partnership in 1982.18 She was the only woman among the
eighty-eight candidates proposed that year,' 9 and had outperformed
her competition by successfully securing more major contracts for
Price Waterhouse than any other candidate.2° She played a key role
in securing a $25 million State Department contract for the account-
ing firm.21 In supporting her bid for partnership, the partners in Hop-
kins' office called this effort "an outstanding performance" carried out
"virtually at the partnership level."'22
Hopkins' colleagues praised her character as well as her accom-
plishments.23 They described her as "an outstanding professional"
who had a "deft touch ... strong character, independence and integ-
rity."' 24 Clients also had high praise for Hopkins. One State Depart-
ment official described her as "extremely competent, intelligent ...





17. Id. at 232-33.
18. Id. at 233.
19. Id.






UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative."'25
Another official praised her decisiveness, broadmindedness, and
"intellectual clarity."' 26 At trial, the district court concluded that
Hopkins "had no difficulty dealing with clients and her clients appear
to have been very pleased with her work" and that she "was generally
viewed as a highly competent project leader who worked long hours,
pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much from the
multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked.
'27
Despite her outstanding performance, Hopkins' bid for partner-
ship was placed on hold. 28 Thirty-two partners had submitted com-
ments on Hopkins' candidacy. Thirteen supported her bid for
partnership, three recommended her candidacy be placed on hold,
eight said they had no informed opinion about her, and eight recom-
mended that she be denied partnership.29 When Hopkins was later
informed that she would not be reproposed for partnership and that
the partners in her office had withdrawn their support, she brought a
sex discrimination action against Price Waterhouse under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30
At trial, the district court found that the firm had considered
both legitimate and illegitimate factors in its decision not to admit
Hopkins as a partner. The court found that Price Waterhouse legiti-
mately emphasized interpersonal skills in its partnership decision, 3'
an area in which Hopkins received harsh criticism.3 2 Specifically, the
court found that Hopkins had difficulty dealing with staff members;
that "[s]upporters and opponents of her candidacy indicated that she
was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with
and impatient with staff," and that "[s]he sometimes used profanity
and appeared to be insensitive to others. ' 33 Later, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's findings, noting that "Hopkins' aggres-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1112-13).
28. Id. at 233.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 231-32. Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e (West 1991), is considered
the centerpiece of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It was the first effort by the federal government
to establish a national standard of employment practices. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 35 (2d ed. 1988). The statute makes it unlawful for an
employer "to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1991).
31. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1114.
32. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
33. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
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siveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness." 4
However, the trial court also found that "[d]iscriminatory stere-
otyping of females was permitted to play a part" in Price
Waterhouse's evaluation process.3 5 In their evaluation of Hopkins,
partners commented that she was "macho"3 6 and may have
"overcompensated for being a woman."3 7 Another suggested that she
needed to take a "course at charm school."3 Several partners criti-
cized her use of profanity. In order to improve her chances for part-
nership, Hopkins was advised to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."
39
Because the firm gave substantial weight to these comments, and
failed to address the problem of stereotyping in the partners' evalua-
tions, the decision to place Hopkins' candidacy on hold was "tainted"
by a discriminatory bias.' The district court found for Hopkins on
the issue of liability4' and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed.42 The Court granted certiorari to resolve
a conflict among the circuits concerning the burden of proof in a
mixed-motive suit brought under Title VII.
4 3
In its opinion, the Court distinguished a mixed-motive case from
a pretext case. In a mixed-motive case, the Court noted that "there is
no one 'true' motive behind the decision."" Rather, the employment
decision reflects multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate.45
By contrast, a pretext case presents no direct evidence of discrimina-
tion,' although intent to discriminate may be inferred from the plain-
tiff's proof of a prima facie case of disparate treatment.47
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,48 the Court established a
four-part test setting out what a plaintiff must show to create an infer-
ence that her employer's decision showed an intent to discriminate.
This allocation was later reaffirmed in Texas Department of Commu-
34. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
35. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
36. Id. at 1117.
37. Id. at 1116-17.
38. Id. at 1117.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1120.
41. Id.
42. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 473.
43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232.
44. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 256-57.
47. Id.
48. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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nity Affairs v. Burdine.49 Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she belongs to a protected
minority; (2) that she applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (3) that she was rejected; and (4)
that the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons with the complainant's qualifications. 50 Once
the plaintiff proves these facts, the employer's conduct is presumed
discriminatory.5 To rebut the presumption, the employer needs to
articulate some reason why the plaintiff was rejected.5 2 If the defend-
ant is able to allege facts which raise a question as to whether its
actions were discriminatory, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the reason asserted by the defendant was not the true reason for
the action, but merely a pretext to hide the employer's intent to dis-
criminate.5 3 The court then weighs the evidence, and decides in favor
of the defendant in the event of a draw, because the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion.54 In essence, the court must choose
between two alternative and contradictory stories of a single motive
for the defendant's action.
In Price Waterhouse, however, the Court noted that "[w]here a
decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives ... it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate
reason was 'the "true reason." ' "" Such an inquiry "would require a
plaintiff who challenges an adverse employment decision in which
both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part to pre-
tend that the decision, in fact, stemmed from a single source-for the
premise of Burdine is that either a legitimate or an illegitimate set of
considerations led to the challenged decision. ' 56 Instead, the Court
crafted a new standard for a mixed-motive case. In his plurality opin-
ion, Justice Brennan held that "the plaintiff who shows that an imper-
missible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment
decision"' 7 shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show
by a preponderance of the evidence "that it would have made the
same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive."5
As the Court noted in referring to Hopkins' asserted failures of
49. 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981).
50. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
51. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
52. Id. at 254-55.
53. Id. at 256.
54. Id.
55. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247.
56. Id.




interpersonal skills, Hopkins' "perceived shortcomings in this impor-
tant area eventually doomed her bid for partnership. 5 9 At trial,
Price Waterhouse conceded that Hopkins probably would have been
promoted to partner "but for" the complaints about her interpersonal
skills.' The trial judge found that the firm did not fabricate com-
plaints about Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimina-
tion.6' However, to say that the comments were not a pretext for
discrimination misses the point that the comments themselves reflect
a sexual bias. The legitimacy of the partners' evaluations of Hopkins'
interpersonal skills is highly questionable in light of their "impermis-
sibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women."' 62 To neatly
categorize one set of remarks by the partners as "sex stereotyping"
and another set as "legitimate" concerns about interpersonal skills is
to ignore the inherently suspect quality of all their subjective
evaluations.
What is most disturbing about the Price Waterhouse decision is
the Court's unquestioning approval of the so-called "legitimate" rea-
sons given by Price Waterhouse for refusing to admit Hopkins as a
partner. 63  Considering Hopkins' "token ' 64  status at Price
Waterhouse, the "double bind ' 65 she was placed in as a woman in a
man's world, and the specific terms used to describe her interpersonal
shortcomings, the partners' evaluation of Hopkins was anything but
legitimate. In other words, the partners' motives may not have been
"mixed" at all-a fact the Court failed to recognize.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX STEREOTYPING
Both the partners' understanding and their evaluations of Hop-
kins' interpersonal skills must be examined in the context of our
knowledge of sex stereotyping. A key element in that context is the
fact that Hopkins was a token in a large organization. When only a
few women are in upper management positions, they are exposed to
many subtle forms of discrimination, particularly when evaluated by
their male peers. An extensive study by Professor Rosabeth Moss
Kanter documented the group dynamics that occur in a corporation
when only a few women are employed on a professional or manage-
59. Id. at 234.
60. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
61. Id. at 1114.
62. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236-37.
63. Id. at 234.
64. ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 208 (1977).
65. Jane Prather, Why Can't Women Be More Like Men, 15 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 172 (1971).
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ment level. 66 She labeled as "skewed" a group, like a public account-
ing firm, in which there is a large preponderance (defined as 85% or
more) of one type of person. 67 Those who comprise the majority
group are identified as "dominants," while the minority group mem-
bers are called "tokens."6
Professor Kanter's study revealed the interaction between the
dominants' stereotyping of the tokens and the dominants' perceptions
of the tokens' performance, and the consequences of this interaction
for the tokens' status.69 Tokens are more easily stereotyped than peo-
ple found in greater proportions.7 ° While they are highly visible
because of their rarity, tokens are "not permitted the individuality of
their own unique, non-stereotypical characteristics.""' This visibility
means that a token's performance is carefully scrutinized, often caus-
ing her to experience performance pressures. 72 Every characteristic of
the token could be a topic of conversation. For example, Professor
Kanter found that when a token woman used a swear word in an
informal setting with colleagues, she was quickly labelled as a
"radical. ,73
Another consequence of the token's high visibility is that her sta-
tus threatens to eclipse other aspects of her performance.74 A token
does not have to work hard to get noticed, but she does have to work
hard to have her achievements noticed.75 In Kanter's study, the
women's technical abilities as sales representatives were likely to be
overshadowed by an awareness of their physical appearances, creating
an additional performance pressure.76 Outstanding performance by a
token does not free her from the bind of tokenism. Instead, it triggers
yet another performance pressure: not to make the dominants look
66. KANTER, supra note 64, at 208-42.
67. Id. at 208.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 206. Later research suggests, however, that the consequences of "token" status
differs for men and women. In one study, men were perceived to be the most masculine when
they had "solo" status, whereas similarly situated females were perceived to be least feminine.
Solo males were easily integrated as group leaders because both the solo and other group
members were accustomed to it. However, each group became dissatisfied when there was no
subservient role for the solo woman to fulfill and she had to be integrated into the groups as a
peer. Violation of traditional roles may lead to problems in groups with solo status members.
See Jennifer Crocker & Kathleen M. McGraw, What's Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the
Gander, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sc1. 357, 366-67 (1984).
70. KANTER, supra note 64, at 211.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id.





bad."" Tokens must "toe the fine line between doing just well enough
and too well." ' One woman in Kanter's study said "the company
she worked for had fired another woman for not being aggressive
enough," and although she succeeded in "doing all they asked and
brought in the largest amount of new business during the past year,
[she] was criticized for being 'too aggressive, too much of a
hustler.' ""
Dominants maintain their generalizations about tokens, despite
their presence as colleagues, by categorizing them into stereotypical
roles that preserve familiar forms of interaction between the token
and the dominants8 0 Among the roles examined, the most important
one for the purposes of this analysis is the iron maiden. A strong
woman is typically characterized as an iron maiden81 because she is
perceived as "tough" or "dangerous" by her male peers. Once estab-
lished in the iron maiden role, a woman may be stereotyped as
tougher then she actually is, and trapped in a more militant stance
then she might have chosen. 2
With this in mind, consider Hopkins' place at Price Waterhouse.
Accounting was, and continues to be, a male-dominated field a and
partnership status has been particularly elusive for women in the "Big
Eight" accounting firms.8 4 Hopkins, for example, was the only
77. Id. at 217.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 233. The other roles identified by Professor Kanter are: 1) the mother, expected
to comfort the men in the group when they came to her with their private troubles; 2) the
seductress, seen as sexually desirable and potentially available, and a source of considerable
tension within the group; and 3) the pet, adopted by the male group as a cute, amusing "little
thing" and taken along on group events as mascot-a cheerleader for shows of prowess. Id. at
233-35.
81. Id. at 236.
82. Id.
83. ANN HARRIMAN, WOMEN/MEN/MANAGEMENT 228 (1985). One study con-
centrating on the accounting profession showed there is still a preference for male applicants,
though 85% of the employers claimed that they treated male and female applicants equally.
In the study, application letters were sent in response to advertisements for accounting
positions at several levels of skills. If the employer sent back an application form or scheduled
an interview, the effort was considered "successful." Male applicants had considerably more
success then identically qualified females. Id. at 228.
84. Women represented three percent of the partners in the "Big Eight" public accounting
firms in 1986, as compared to one percent in 1983, a small increase in light of the growth in the
number of women actually in the field. Martha S. Weisel, Sexual Stereotyping in Partnership
Decisions: The Second Stage, THE WOMAN CPA, Oct. 1989, at 4 (citations omitted). Price
Waterhouse, a professional partnership specializing in auditing, .tax, and management
consulting services primarily for private corporations and government agencies, is among the
firms in that group. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 461. In 1991, women held four percent of
all partnerships at Price Waterhouse. Julie Goss, She Took the Lead and Make It Up Stairway
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woman among the eighty-eight candidates proposed for partnership
at Price Waterhouse in 1982.85 All of the partners in her office were
men,8 6 and as of 1984, only seven out of the firm's 662 partners were
women. 7 Certainly, this "skewed" 8 ratio made Hopkins a "token"8 9
as a partnership candidate. An overall impression of Hopkins
emerges from the partners' comments: she was perceived as an iron
maiden. They described her interpersonal skills in iron-maiden terms:
"overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient
with staff."'  Another partner, in fact, suggested that these other
partners objected to her swearing only "because it's a lady using foul
language." 91
A noted social psychologist, Dr. Susan Fiske,92 testified at trial
for Hopkins, explaining that even some gender-neutral remarks made
by the partners could be the product of sex stereotyping. 93 For exam-
ple, one partner claimed that "Hopkins was 'universally disliked' by
staff.., and another described her as 'consistently annoying and irri-
tating'... ; yet these were people who had had very little contact with
Hopkins."'94 Dr. Fiske pointed out that "Hopkins' uniqueness (as the
only woman in the pool of candidates) and the subjectivity of the eval-
uations made it likely that sharply critical remarks.., were the prod-
uct of sex stereotyping." 95 Certainly, this same analysis could apply
to the evaluation of Hopkins' interpersonal skills. Given the direct
evidence of the partners' discriminatory view of women, and the
expert testimony on the gendered quality of the "gender-neutral" crit-
icism of Hopkins, it is impossible to characterize the partners' evalua-
tion of Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a "legitimate" factor properly
considered in a partnership decision.96
of Success, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at B3 (profiling a women who became the third
woman to make partner in the 84-year history of Price Waterhouse's Seattle office).
85. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. KANTER, supra note 64, at 208.
89. Id.
90. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
91. Id.
92. During the course of the litigation, there was intense negative reaction to Dr. Fiske's
testimony. Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 91-92 (1991). She was "disparaged, dismissed as irrelevant, and
accused of lacking professional integrity." Id. at 91. Professor Chamallas argues that "much
of the criticism of Fiske was itself sexist." Id. at 92. Even Justice Brennan was tempted to call
Fiske's testimony merely "icing on [Hopkins'] cake." Id. at 91.
93. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235-36.
94. Id. at 235.




The centerpiece of the partners' criticism of Hopkins' interper-
sonal skills was her perceived abrasiveness. This perception tainted
the partners' evaluation in two related ways. First, aggression, like
other characteristics attributed to males, is negatively evaluated when
displayed by women.97 Because many of these masculine characteris-
tics are the norm in business and the professions, women who enter
traditionally male-dominated fields are caught in a double bind. Sec-
ond, women whose behavior deviates from the feminine stereotypes of
docility and passivity are perceived as more aggressive because of this
break from "tradition." 98 A survey of social psychology literature
reveals that both kinds of sex stereotyping were operating against
Hopkins at Price Waterhouse.
Our society values men and masculine characteristics more
highly than women and feminine characteristics."9 Nurturance,
accommodating warmth, and eagerness to soothe hurt feelings are
thought of as feminine,"° while assertiveness, competitiveness, domi-
nance, and standing up well under pressure are considered mascu-
line.101 However, women who display these highly valued masculine
traits are not held in the same high regard as men who display them.
Instead, they are labelled as deviants'012 because they do not conform
to the perception of the ideal woman: less aggressive, less independ-
ent, less dominant, less active, more emotional, and more
indecisive. 103
This perception of the ideal women and her proper role in society
was articulated more than 100 years ago in Justice Bradley's concur-
rence in the oft-cited Supreme Court case, Bradwell v. State.' °4 A
state's refusal to permit a woman the right to practice law violated no
constitutional right because the "paramount destiny and mission of
women" under the "law of the Creator" is "to fulfil [sic] the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother."'1 5 While some would like to dis-
miss such language as a reflection of the past, much of its viewpoint
pervades the workplace today. Masculine personality qualities are
97. $ ee supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. Inge K. Broverman et al., Sex-Role Stereotypes:- A Current Appraisal, 28 J. Soc.
IssuEs 59, 65 (1972).
100. Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Perceived Sex Differences in Managerially
Relevant Characteristics, 4 SEx ROLEs 837, 842 (1978).
101. P.T.P. Wong et al., On the Importance of Being Masculine: Sex Role, Attribution, and
Women's Career Achievement, 12 SEX ROLES 757, 766 (1985).
102. EDWIN M. SCHUR, LABELING WOMEN DEVIANT 51-52 (1983).
103. Broverman et al., supra note 99, at 69.
104. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
105. Id. at 141.
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still considered helpful to compete successfully in male-dominated
occupations. 16 Successful managers are perceived to possess those
characteristics, attitudes, and temperaments more commonly ascribed
to men than women. 107 For instance, attributes found in most profes-
sional and occupational roles are considered to be masculine: persis-
tence and drive, personal dedication, aggressiveness, emotional
detachment, and a kind of sexless matter-of-factness equated with
intellectual performance. 08
Similarly, many norms regarding desirable work-related behav-
iors are often not compatible with norms regarding behaviors appro-
priate to the female sex role."° In one study, general competence was
expected on the job, but not of women."10 As a result, a woman who
behaves in a competent manner deviates from sex role expectations,
and usually suffers one or both of two possible fates. Either she is
disliked and excluded from the group, or her performance is dis-
counted and attributed to chance."'I Successful performance by
females, particularly in masculine and demanding situations, is often
perceived as a freak phenomenon, attributable not to the woman's
real abilities, but to other unstable or external factors."1
2
In particular, traits considered desirable for effective workers
often conflict with those considered appropriate for women.
113
"Assertiveness ... is frequently a necessary attribute for success in
many areas, but is regarded negatively for women.""I 4 Women who
adopt a masculine orientation may be considered more competent by
their employers, but this strategy tends to alienate co-workers.'"
"[I]f the woman wishing success emulates the masculine characteris-
tics deemed essential for the job, she is then called 'unfeminine,'
'aggressive,' or other adjectives considered derogatory for women. "116
On the other hand, if she does not demonstrate these so-called mascu-
line characteristics, she may be considered inadequate for the job.
117
106. Wong et al., supra note 101, at 766.
107. Virginia E. Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requisite
Management Characteristics, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 95, 99 (1973).
108. CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE 23 (1970).
109. Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 ACAD. MGMT.





114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. John R. Adams et al., Analyzing Stereotypes of Women in the Work Force, 5 SEX
ROLES 581, 583 (1979).




This double bind typifies some of the difficulties women face trying to
enter the top echelons of business and professions.' Justice Brennan
characterized this double bind as "an intolerable and impermissible
Catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not."I 9 Women in male-dominated professions may be par-
ticularly susceptible to this conflict, because such occupations are
likely to have strong, masculine-oriented traditions of behavior.
120
Given the underlying assumption in these findings-that success-
ful performance in a management or professional position requires the
male norm-many women are likely to respond by adopting these
behavioral norms.' 2' However, this adaptive behavior is not without
its consequences. Because this behavior deviates from sex role norms,
women who display male characteristics are often perceived as more
aggressive (or competitive, or insensitive) than men who display iden-
tical behavior.' 22 This exaggerated misperception of identical behav-
118. Id.
119. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
120. Adams et al., supra note 115, at 584.
121. See Jeanne P. Lemkau, Women in Male Dominated Professions: Distinguishing
Personality and Background Characteristics, 8 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 144, 161 (1983) (noting
that the tough-minded, assertive stance of women in atypical occupations may be viewed as
realistic and adaptive for negotiating male-dominated occupational environments
characterized by discrimination). This Note does not address whether these so-called
masculine traits are really a "business necessity" or merely a vestige of the perception that
management is a "man's job." But see Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
839 F.2d 302, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial court did not err in finding that subjective testing
practices were not sufficient to prove discrimination). Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins raises a
different issue: even if a woman has the "necessary" job qualifications, can she be judged fairly
by her male peers?
122. Sarah L. Hoagland, 'Femininity,' Resistance and Sabotage, in "FEMININITY,"
"MASCULINITY," AND "ANDROGYNY" 85, 87 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin ed., 1982). "To
suggest the behavior is qualitatively different begs the question; it presupposes that w[omen]
and men have different natures prior to investigating the hypothesis ..... [S]uch a suggestion
fails to consider the context of these perceptions-a society based on the rule of the fathers."
Id. Hoagland draws on a "humorous" characterization of the differences between
businessmen and businesswomen who behave identically:
A businessman is aggressive.
A businesswoman is pushy.
He's careful about detail.
She's picky.
He loses his temper because he's involved in his job.
She's bitchy.
He isn't afraid to say what he think.
She's opinionated.
He's a stern task maker.
She's difficult to work for.
He follows through.
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ior operates to further narrow the range of acceptable behavior for
women in male-dominated fields.' 23 An aggressive or assertive
woman is seen as abrasive because she violates "sexpectations." Con-
sequently, female applicants for managerial positions may be evalu-
ated as less acceptable than male applicants with identical
qualifications. 24
There also may be a tendency to discriminate against female
applicants for managerial positions based on perceptions and expecta-
tions regarding a female employee's interpersonal competence and
dependability, as well as her technical skill.' 25
[D]espite the feminist movement, males still hold significantly
more negative attitudes towards women managers than
females.... [Research] suggests that male managers with negative
attitudes are predisposed to act on these attitudes when dealing
with women in organizations. Such actions may be particularly
detrimental to women managers with respect to advances in salary
and position.'
26
Such subtle bias may operate without detection when a subjective
evaluation is used to appraise a woman's performance.
Evaluations that are subjective are more likely to be tainted by
this male bias because they reveal the evaluators' unreflective percep-
tions of the employee's performance-perceptions that cannot be
reduced to a standardized measure. For example, if a job calls for a
worker to be able to lift fifty pounds, any worker able to perform that
task would satisfy that objective criterion. Regardless of the
employer's perception of a woman's ability to lift that weight, she
could prove she met the standard for the position if she successfully
completed the task. However, it is more difficult to filter out bias in a
subjective evaluation, where the employee's qualifications are seen
through the evaluator's lens, and cannot be verified by any standard-
ized measure.
Concededly, in certain employment decisions, particularly pro-






123. Id. at 87. ("Femininity exists to limit [women]; in these cases we are unable toperceive
certain behavior outside the feminine stereotype.").
124. Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Effects of Applicant's Sex and Difficulty of Job on
Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 511, 512 (1974).
125. Id. at 512.
126. Peter Dubno, Attitudes Toward Women Executives: A Longitudinal Approach, 28
ACAD. MGMT. J. 235, 238 (1985).
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fessional and supervisory areas, the employer's use of subjective crite-
ria is unavoidable. 27 Unfortunately, many male evaluators may not
know how to evaluate women with any measure of neutrality. 2 An
evaluating supervisor may look for traits that the supervisor feels he
himself has, and if he is male, may find them more easily in other
males than in women.' 29 Compatibility, 30 for instance, inevitably
involves subjective judgment,' 3 as do leadership, and identification
with the organization's goals. 3 2 Upper level subjective systems typi-
cally invest decisionmakers with broad discretion, allowing personal
bias to enter into the decisionmaking process and inviting selection of
candidates who resemble those doing the selecting. 33 Indeed, the
more subjective or ambiguous the definition of quality, the more likely
bias due to stereotypes will occur.
34
IV. THE MIXED-MOTIVE QUESTION
A. The Court's Analysis
A cursory look at Price Waterhouse's partnership evaluation sys-
tem reveals its bias towards sex stereotyping. At Price Waterhouse,
partners who have significant recent contact with the partnership can-
didate submit "long form" evaluations; partners who only have lim-
ited contact with the candidate submit "short form" evaluations. 
3
The partners numerically rank the candidate in comparison to other
recent partnership candidates in forty-eight categories, ranging from
practice development and technical expertise to interpersonal skills
and civic activities.' 36 The partners are also asked to indicate whether
they believe the candidate should be admitted to the partnership,
denied partnership, or held for further consideration, and to explain
their assessment with a short comment.3 7 Although the Admissions
Committee may ask some partners to clarify their views, the evalu-
127. Len Biernat, Subjective Criteria in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title VII. A
Camouflage for Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 501, 512
(1987).
128. Id. at 514.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 515.
131. Id.
132. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
947, 996 (1982).
133. Id.
134. Thomas L. Ruble et al., Sex Stereotypes, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 339, 347 (1984).
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ation process is highly susceptible to bias because it depends primarily
on the perceptions of male partners, who rank the candidate in com-
parison with other recent, male candidates. Moreover, the process is
based heavily on factors that are ambiguous, subjective, and easily
manipulated, rather than on concrete, objective criteria. 139 If Hop-
kins' evaluation had been supported by some standardized measure of
performance, such as the number of reprimands, outbursts, or com-
plaints due to Hopkins' interpersonal skills, the partners' conclusions
would have had at least an "underpinning of objectivity."' t40 Finally,
although much of the intense criticism Hopkins received came from
people who had a little interaction with her, these comments were
given equal weight in the evaluation process.
The Court, however, failed to address the bias present in the
firm's evaluation of Hopkins' interpersonal skills. Despite the direct
evidence of sex stereotyping, the Court accepted Price Waterhouse's
assessment that Hopkins was "difficult," and therefore, presumptively
undeserving of partnership status, rather than scrutinizing the part-
nership selection process more closely. In affirming the district
court's findings, the Court recognized that some of the partners' com-
ments were sex-linked, reflecting a negative reaction to Hopkins' per-
sonality because she was a woman. 41 The Court had little difficulty
acknowledging, for instance, that remarks characterizing Hopkins as
"macho" or "overcompensat[ing] for being a woman" were tainted by
sex stereotyping.142 In that regard, they found the coup de grice to be
the advice given to Hopkins to "walk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.' 43
Yet for all the Court's ability to recognize the more obvious sex stere-
otyping in the evaluation process, it failed to reach the more subtle
discrimination that tainted the assessment of Hopkins' personality.
The Court unquestioningly accepted the firm's harsh evaluation of
Hopkins' personality and concluded that her "aggressiveness appar-
ently spilled over into abrasiveness,'"144 without further examining the
139. Ruble et al., supra note 134, at 347 Interestingly, biases tend to be reduced when the
rater is given objective data. Id. at 349. Negative evaluations of competent women are least
likely in situations where persons are judging someone they know well, or with whom they
have worked or interacted. Bernice Lott, Devaluation of Women's Competence, 41 J. Soc.
ISSUES 43, 55 (1985).
140. See Donald R. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10
GA. L. REV. 737, 749 (1976) (describing "a dozen canons" courts have applied when
evaluating subjective criteria in discrimination litigation).
141. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 234.
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employment context in which the appraisal was made. Hopkins' uni-
queness in the pool of partnership candidates, her deviation from the
feminine stereotype, the exaggerated perception of her "aggressive"
behavior by her male peers, the use of a subjective evaluation, and the
direct evidence of sex stereotyping all strongly suggest that the evalu-
ation of Hopkins' interpersonal skills was also imbued with discrimi-
nation. By failing to recognize that the terms used to describe
Hopkins' personality were not gender neutral in the context of her
employment situation, the Court legitimated this highly suspect
factor.
A simple analogy illustrates the problem with the Court's limited
inquiry. Imagine a person being denied a promotion for the facially
neutral reason that he is considered "too uppity" or "too pushy" by
his employer. Would this still seem a neutral, legitimate reason if we
knew that the employee in question was black in an overwhelmingly
white environment, or a Jew in a Gentile one? In the Price
Waterhouse case and similar employment contexts, the terms "too
aggressive" or "abrasive" reflect this same kind of prejudice against
women. A modification of the Court's holding in Price Waterhouse
would counter this pervasive and subtle form of discrimination.
B. An Alternative Approach to Mixed-Motive Cases
Under Title VII
Where there is direct evidence of sex stereotyping, in addition to
a so-called legitimate factor such as a subjective evaluation of inter-
personal skills, the Supreme Court's mixed-motive analysis is inade-
quate. The standard may not be sensitive enough to reach the subtle
forms of sex discrimination demonstrated in the Price Waterhouse
case. The Court cannot end its inquiry by finding that a negative eval-
uation of interpersonal skills is legitimate and asking whether the
employment decision would have been made for this reason alone. To
do so ignores the inherently suspect nature of such an evaluation in a
given employment context.
In a mixed-motive case, the employer should be required to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence not only that it would have
made the same employment decision absent the impermissible factor,
but that the remaining "legitimate" factor was not also tainted by sex
discrimination. Where the "legitimate" factor is a subjective evalua-
tion of ambiguous personality traits, the court should require an
employer to prove that a male employee with the same personality
traits would be similarly evaluated. The employer should have to
prove that similar behavior is similarly labeled. The court should
19921
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require the employer to demonstrate that differences in evaluations of
interpersonal skills between male and female employees are due to
actual behavioral differences and not merely to differences in percep-
tion and tolerance, depending on the worker's sex. Finally, the
employer should have to prove that the same qualities were evaluated
in all candidates. Only then would an employer in a mixed-motive
case have carried its burden of persuasion that the "legitimate" factor
it cited was not tainted by its other impermissible considerations.
This is not to suggest that, under the proposed rule, a token
woman in a male-dominated profession could never receive a fair and
accurate negative evaluation of her interpersonal skills. Certainly, an
employer could produce evidence of specific incidents of objectionable
behavior, describing the circumstances of the offense, the frequency of
the outbursts, and what, if any, disciplinary action was taken against
other similarly situated individuals. Instead of merely relying on gen-
der-linked adjectives such as "aggressive" or "abrasive," the employer
would have to provide explanations of specific incidents that put the
employee's interpersonal skills beyond the range of acceptable behav-
ior in a professional setting. The employer should bear this burden
because direct evidence of its consideration of an obviously impermis-
sible factor in the employment decision raises the inference of taint in
its subjective evaluation of the employee alleging discrimination. In
other words, the employer must show that the point at which aggres-
siveness "spill[s] over into abrasiveness" is the same whether the
employee is a man or a woman.
14 5
Applying the proposed rule to Hopkins' situation would severely
undermine the evidence that led the district court to conclude that the
criticism of Hopkins was legitimate. At trial, Hopkins introduced
past partnership records that identified two male candidates "who
were criticized for their interpersonal skills because they were per-
ceived as being aggressive, overbearing, abrasive or crude, but were
recommended.., and elected partner."'" Despite reservations about
the candidates' interpersonal skills, Price Waterhouse made a "busi-
ness decision" to admit the pair.'47 Apparently, the candidates had
skills especially needed by the firm, and the partners feared that those
talents would be lost if the candidates were placed on hold. 48 The
district court noted that in comparison to Hopkins, the male candi-
dates received fewer "no" votes and "the negative comments on these
145. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.





candidates were less intense then those directed at the plaintiff." '49
This led the district court to conclude that Price Waterhouse had
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reasons to distinguish between Hop-
kins and the men who were made partners. 150 However, under the
proposed rule, showing that the two men received less criticism, with-
out further proof that their behavior was actually less offensive than
Hopkins', would be insufficient to meet the burden of persuasion. The
comparison would be especially suspect in light of a comment from
one of the partners admitting that "many male partners [were] worse
than [Hopkins]" in their language and tough personality."5 '
Hopkins may not have been the first female partnership candi-
date to fall victim to this form of subtle discrimination. At least two
other women candidates had been rejected in previous years "because
partners believed that they were curt, brusque and abrasive, acted like
'Ma Barker' or tried to be 'one of the boys.' "132 While acknowledg-
ing that sex stereotyping may have influenced the partners' evalua-
tions of interpersonal skills, 53 the trial judge was unwilling to find
that this subtle form of discrimination constituted an intentional dis-
criminatory motive or purpose.1 54 Likewise, the Supreme Court's
mixed-motive analysis fails to reach this discrimination because the
employer need not show that characteristics such as aggressiveness or
abrasiveness are evaluated equally whether the employee is male or
female, or that these terms are applied evenhandedly, accurately
describing the same behavior. The proposed rule would require a
court to look beneath value-laden language used by the employer and
examine the factual basis upon which the evaluation is made.
The rule could also be applied where there is no direct evidence
of discrimination. For example, in a pretext situation, the plaintiff, as
part of her prima facie case, could demonstrate through expert testi-
mony and personnel records that males and females were not evalu-
ated similarly when subjective criteria were used. The rule would
allow a plaintiff to launch a pre-emptive strike against the employer
by requiring the defendant to prove that a negative evaluation of
interpersonal skills was not tainted by sex stereotyping. Because this
kind of subjective evaluation is highly susceptible to bias, the mere
production of a poor evaluation of interpersonal skills would not be
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's inference of discrimination. If the
149. Id.
150. Id.
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defendant-employer failed to produce evidence of specific incidents
that formed the basis of the evaluation, the plaintiff would prevail as a
matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note calls for a modification of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and proposes a rule that places
additional evidentiary burdens on a defendant-employer in a mixed-
motive case brought under Title VII. The proposed rule would pre-
vent an employer from escaping liability by merely proving that it
would have made the same employment decision absent its considera-
tion of an impermissible factor. It would require an employer to
prove that other "legitimate" factors it considered were also free of
sex discrimination. The proposed rule would enable courts to reach
more subtle forms of bias present in subjective evaluations by requir-
ing this additional burden of proof, and move the Court beyond rec-
ognition of the most blatant forms of sex stereotyping to a more
sensitive test for discrimination. As employers become more sophisti-
cated in masking their discriminatory motives, so too must the Court
become more sophisticated in crafting tests to detect it.
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